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WANDERING WITHOUT A TORCH:  
FEDERALISM AS A GUIDING LIGHT 
Mark Mancini* 
“If the national mental illness of the United States is megalomania, that of 
Canada is paranoid schizophrenia.” – Margaret Atwood1 
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
It is uncontroversial to state that the constitutional entrenchment of an inherent right 
of Aboriginal self-government has vexed jurists, legislators, and Aboriginal peoples 
for generations over. The historic failure of the Charlottetown Accord is evidence of 
this vexation. The Charlottetown Accord would have entrenched a third order of 
Aboriginal self-government (similar to the provincial order of government set out in 
s.92 of the Constitution Act, 1867) and set out its relationship to the catalogue of 
federal and provincial powers in the Constitution Act, 1867.2 This third order of 
government would have been inherent: it would arise because of an Aboriginal 
group’s distinctive history and would not be dependent on Crown sovereignty.  Of 
course, that accord failed by referendum, leaving the Constitution devoid of any 
recognition of a third order of government in the Canadian constitutional framework. 
The aftermath of the Charlottetown Accord and the subsequent failure to explicitly 
entrench an inherent right of self-government for Aboriginal peoples can be chalked 
up to at least two historical problems: the common law method and the difficulty of 
constitutional amendment. Both of these historical problems contribute today to the 
wandering of Aboriginal peoples without a torch in the annals of constitutional law. 
Thus, wrapping our heads around these issues is vitally important; particularly as we 
enter an era of reconciliation in Canada, following the election of a government that 
promises to do more to build a nation-to-nation relationship.  
 The first historical problem is the common law system—the case law 
method and its interaction with the complex amending formula contained in the 
Canadian Constitution. Justice Antonin Scalia put the essence of the common law 
method succinctly:  
This is the image of the law-the common law-to which an aspiring […] 
lawyer is first exposed, even if he has not read Holmes over the previous 
summer as he was supposed to. He learns the law, not by reading statutes 
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that promulgate it or treatises that summarize it, but rather by studying the 
judicial opinions that invented it. This is the famous case-law method.3  
The natural corollary of the case law method ensures that lawyers litigate; as such, 
the fundamental issues of our time (including the question of inherent Aboriginal 
self-government) are punted to the courts. The common law method of adjudicating 
rights has also been supported by the advent of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
(the Charter).4 On this issue, the courts have responded by declining to answer 
whether a right to Aboriginal self-government is an “existing” Aboriginal right 
contained in s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982.5 With the Charter, we are left 
with both a political and legal void on the issue.6 
The second historical problem is the notoriously difficult amendment 
process contained in the Constitution Act, 1982. For ordinary amendments to the 
Constitution, seven of the provinces representing 50% of the population must agree.7 
For some amendments, unanimous provincial consent is required.8 The difficulty in 
amending the Constitution continues to lead to real political consequences; now, 
constitutional amendments are covered with the cloak of impossibility. As such, a 
generation of Aboriginal sympathizers and advocates in the common law tradition 
have forced Aboriginal issues to the courts. 
These two historical forces have led us to the current page of Canada’s 
constitutional story. Inherent (pre-existing and not granted by the Constitution)9 
Aboriginal self-government does not truly exist in Canada. In other words, “at the 
time of Confederation there was no independent recognition of the status of the 
jurisdiction of Aboriginal governments.”10 Instead, the Canadian government and 
Aboriginal groups, because of the difficulty of establishing a constitutional mandate, 
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have opted for delegated forms of authority operating under Crown authority.11 This 
is not inherent government in the sense that the legitimacy of Aboriginal self-
government derives from the historic occupation of lands by Aboriginal peoples; 
instead, legitimacy comes from a transfer of Crown sovereignty.12 The Constitution, 
in other words, does not recognize the different basis of legitimacy for Aboriginal 
rights.13 This is not a complete vindication of Aboriginal rights, nor has it led to any 
clarity in the relationship between the Canadian Constitution and the rights 
emanating from self-government. Indeed, the only substantial statement on 
Aboriginal self-government coming from the government in recent memory was the 
1995 Self-Government Statement. But this does not carry the day—it is not a matter 
of constitutional law.14 Thus, we are at a crossroads: the Supreme Court of Canada 
has not directly tackled the implications for federalism and the division of powers if 
Aboriginal self-government does, indeed, exist.15 
Not all is lost. The fact that Canadian federalism, in constitutional letter, 
does not recognize an inherent right to Aboriginal self-government is not an 
inexorable conclusion. Indeed, starting from first principles, the political system of 
federalism is conceptually broader than its codification into the terms of the 
Constitution Act, 1867. The Supreme Court of Canada recognized as much in the 
Quebec Secession Reference, listing federalism as one of the unwritten constitutional 
principles of Canada.16  
All of this said, this paper will argue that the issue of Aboriginal self-
government should be revisited from the perspective of federalism. To that end, I 
will focus on the benefits which might accrue from the recognition, once and for all, 
of an inherent right to self-government for Aboriginal peoples in the Canadian 
Constitution. This means, in turn, recognizing that the legitimacy of Aboriginal self-
government does not derive from Crown sovereignty, nor is it recognized as a 
limited scope, Van der Peet Aboriginal right.17 Rather, it is a problem of jurisdiction 
that can be understood through the doctrines of federalism. On this reading, we have 
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been barking up the wrong tree to vindicate Aboriginal rights. Relying on the 
Charter for resolution is not ideal. 
In order to make this contention, this paper will proceed in two parts. In Part 
I, I will describe the salient features of political federalism to explain why federalism 
can encompass a truly inherent right to Aboriginal self-government. Political 
federalism, in both theory and practice, has proven capable of flexibility. Various 
doctrines of federalism have led to more flexibility in the Canadian structure, such as 
the aspect doctrine and the pith and substance doctrine. There is no reason to believe 
that this flexibility could not be extended to Aboriginal peoples if they are 
recognized as a third order of government. Beyond flexibility, the text of the 
Constitution Act, 1867 and its subsequent interpretation by the Judicial Committee of 
the Privy Council has led to a generous interpretation of rights for the provincial 
order of government. That same generous interpretation could be applied to inherent 
Aboriginal self-government as a third order of government in Canada. 
In Part II, I will turn to the next logical question: even though political 
federalism can accommodate an inherent right to Aboriginal self-government, why 
should it? This paper will respond to this contention in two ways. First, I will argue 
that federalism will provide clarity and consistency to the relationship between 
Aboriginal peoples and the Government of Canada, while allowing Aboriginal 
peoples the latitude to grow and develop without regard to the tumult of Ottawa’s 
occupants. This will only be possible via the process of constitutional amendment, as 
envisioned by the Charlottetown Accord.18 Second, delegated authority does not 
provide for the scope of independence that has been historically sought by 
Aboriginal peoples in Canada. At least part of the material difficulties that are faced 
by Aboriginal peoples in the 21st century can be chalked up to the legacy of 
colonialism; the inability to truly control their futures as self-governing peoples.19 In 
my estimation, inherent self-government will go some way to creating the conditions 
for the improvement of these material conditions.  
In terms of methodology, this paper will rely heavily on Phillip Bobbitt’s 
Constitutional Fate, which proposes five types of constitutional argumentation.20  I 
will implicitly focus on two of these forms of argument: structural argumentation 
(arguing from the values and framework of the existing constitutional federalism to 
support constitutional amendment) and prudential argumentation (ethical and 
normative claims about the sort of government sought by Aboriginal peoples). Both 
of these types of argument will form the backdrop of this paper. 
Additionally, this paper will endeavour to answer a broader question: why 
does federalism matter anymore? With respect to Aboriginal rights in Canada, 
                                                
18 Rustand, supra note 14 at 11. 
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2009). 
20 Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate: Theory of the Constitution (New York: Oxford University Press, 
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students of law in the last twenty-five years have been inculcated in the Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms. Many of the discussions with respect to the distribution of 
powers, the common law, and the structure of Canadian federalism have been 
forgotten because of an unfortunate case of “Charteritis”—a tendency to forget the 
foundational principles of law that arose before the Charter.21 But we are entering a 
new era in Ottawa: one in which the government has recommitted to a productive 
relationship with Aboriginal peoples and Premiers in Canada. This paper will posit 
that the concepts of federalism and the distribution of powers are tools of 
reconciliation if we are to decide where Aboriginal peoples will fit in the Canadian 
federation.  Such a shift in thinking requires courage; courage to look away from the 
Supreme Court, and towards political channels as a means of vindicating rights. For 
those of us raised on the Charter as our security blanket, that is perhaps the stuff of 
dreams. But, I hope to demonstrate that today’s generation of law students and 
lawyers should not forget their dusty federalism book—it could be vital in placing 
Aboriginal peoples in the Canadian federation.22 
I. THE NATURE OF CANADIAN POLITICAL FEDERALISM 
A. Culture and Demographics 
One cannot begin to evaluate why an express recognition of inherent self-
government in the federal structure is a way forward for Aboriginal peoples without 
first analyzing the values and culture of Canadian federalism. Again, one must start 
from first principles. As noted above, the Court has not yet assessed the implications 
for Canada’s federal system if Aboriginal self-government is recognized as a third 
order.23 Perhaps the Court is unable to do so. For this reason, understanding the very 
bases of Canadian constitutionalism is a starting point to determine the place of 
Aboriginal peoples in the Canadian federation. 
One must begin with the obvious: the text of the law is but one way to 
express legal and quasi-legal principles. In the case of Canadian federalism, there is 
more behind the text. For the purposes of recognizing the ability of federalism to 
accommodate Aboriginal self-government, analyzing what is behind the text is 
vitally important. 
To that end, demographics can influence the law of the Constitution in order 
to understand why federalism is flexible at its core. Noted political scientist Nelson 
Wiseman analyzes this thorny issue in his book In Search of Canadian Political 
Culture. 24  Wiseman argues that culture and Constitution cannot be viewed 
independently of one another. Instead, he posits that cultures create the basis by 
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which Constitutions are understood. He notes that cultures and Constitutions have a 
symbiotic relationship.25 It is for this reason that the demographics at the time of 
Confederation are important for understanding the essence of political federalism—
by analyzing the cultures reflected in the Constitution, one can discern the values 
that the system, reflected in our Constitution, is meant to protect. 
At the time of Confederation, Canada was a sum of many diverse cultures, 
interests, and economic drivers. Confederation was conceived as a plan “whereby, 
through mutual concession, cultural and local loyalties could be preserved and 
reconciled with the political strength and solidarity of the whole.” 26  Mutual 
concession required concrete accommodations for different political collectives; 
English-speaking persons in Lower Canada were expected to release expectations of 
a union with English speakers in Upper Canada, whereas subsidiarity allowed for 
French Canada to be “secured in the sole control of the cherished values it so 
tenaciously held.”27 Those in the Maritimes, similarly, were offered security for their 
own distinctive and historic traditions.28  
Of course, this proposition came with controversy. At least some of the 
Fathers of Confederation desired a unitary state for Canada. To their dismay, such an 
idea was simply not practical, specifically for French Canada.29 George-Etienne 
Cartier, one of Canada’s founding fathers, celebrated the federative principle and its 
ability to protect diversity as a key founding principle of the new nation: “…diversity 
will not disappear. The idea of a fusion of the races in one is utopian; it is an 
impossibility. Distinctions…will always exist.”30  
And distinctions there were. From a historical perspective, 30,000 Loyalists 
settled in Nova Scotia and established New Brunswick, while 10,000 others settled 
in Ontario. 31  French Canadians, of course, were numerous in Lower Canada. 
Federalism was a way to find harmony in the diversity of these component parts. A 
unitary state, where distinctions could not be present, was not a feasible option for 
the creation of a country like Canada, where there were distinctive cultural cleavages 
from the very beginning. 
The relevance of this exercise is clear. Setting the cultural basis in this way 
demonstrates that Canada is not an easily describable entity: it is a sum of its parts, at 
least on the demographic and cultural level. This fact has certain legal implications 
for Aboriginal peoples. Importantly, the legal doctrines that are connected to the 
Canadian cultural reality are important in defining the jurisdictional scope of 
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26 Bora Laskin, Canadian Constitutional Law (Toronto: Carswell, 1969) at 1. 
27 Ibid at 2. 
28 Ibid. 
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31 Ibid at 31. 
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Aboriginal governments in the Canadian constitutional scheme. As will be seen later 
on, this is a fundamental project of Aboriginal constitutional law. 
B. Expression in Law: The Federalism Doctrines and the Judicial 
Committee  
From the foregoing, one can conclude that federalism in theory is reflective of the 
diverse conditions of Canadian Confederation. Based on the demographic 
considerations at play, Confederation was designed to reflect a certain diversity of 
peoples who signed on to the compact. That said, the conclusions thus far have only 
been pertinent to the realm of political science. But they also have import for the law 
of the Constitution. From a canvass of the literature, the political diversity of 
Confederation found its expression in law in two ways: first, through the 
development of various doctrines and interpretive mechanisms which allow for 
flexible legislative action on the part of each order of government, and second, 
through a generous interpretation of local rights by the Judicial Committee of the 
Privy Council. Ultimately, the latter consideration has been a boon for French-
Canadians, and could be similarly beneficial to Aboriginal peoples. But this 
conclusion only follows if Aboriginal peoples are recognized as an order of 
government for the purposes of constitutional law by amendment. 
The Supreme Court of Canada has canvassed the first issue of flexibility. In 
examining the basis of the constitutional framework, the Court certainly agreed with 
Cartier’s conception of Confederation: 
This underlying principle of federalism, then, has exercised a role of 
considerable importance in the interpretation of the written provisions of 
our Constitution.  In the Patriation Reference, supra, at pp. 905-9, we 
confirmed that the principle of federalism runs through the political and 
legal systems of Canada. Indeed, Martland and Ritchie JJ., dissenting in 
the Patriation Reference, at p. 821, considered federalism to be "the 
dominant principle of Canadian constitutional law".  With the enactment 
of the Charter, that proposition may have less force than it once did, but 
there can be little doubt that the principle of federalism remains a central 
organizational theme of our Constitution. Less obviously, perhaps, but 
certainly of equal importance, federalism is a political and legal response 
to underlying social and political realities.32  
Federalism holds an exalted place in the Canadian constitutional order for a 
reason. The underlying social and political realities of which the Court speaks are 
undoubtedly the demographic desires of the distinct majorities and minorities who 
built Confederation. Logically, then, federalism is the political premise by which the 
text of the Constitution is interpreted. This has important implications for Aboriginal 
peoples. 
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The development of federalism as described by the Supreme Court of 
Canada is further reflected in the actual mechanisms that have been judicially created 
to interpret the catalogue of powers contained in ss. 91 and 92. These doctrines do 
not exist in isolation—they contribute to the story of federalism, which is one of 
constant evolution, dynamism and flexibility with respect to the cultural 
particularities of Canada.  The aspect doctrine and the pith and substance doctrine 
are examples of the flexibility of legal federalism as between ss. 91 and 92. It is trite 
that characterization of laws in federalism analysis is conducted by a determination 
of the law’s “pith and substance,” or dominant purpose. 33 Once the pith and 
substance of a law is determined, the law is assigned to a class of subject in s. 91 or 
s. 92.34 But the doctrine necessarily allows for incidental effects or overlap between 
jurisdictional spheres. So long as the pith and substance of the law is wholly within 
the competence of one of the orders of government, the law is constitutional for the 
purposes of the distribution of powers. This means that certain matters may have 
more than one part of equal importance35—each of which could be accessed by the 
provincial or federal governments. This is the essence of the aspect doctrine. One can 
see how it can allow for maximum operation of provincial laws that are particular to 
the cultural specifics of that particular province.  
An example may be useful. The doctrine first arose in 1883. In Hodge v The 
Queen, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council undercut the exclusivity of the 
classes of subjects in ss. 91 and 92.36 Lord Fitzgerald, for the Judicial Committee, 
famously opined, “subjects which in one aspect and for one purpose fall within sec. 
92, may in another aspect and for another purpose fall within sec. 91.”37 The law 
lords further held that the provinces were not subordinate to the federal government; 
in fact, they were coordinate and sovereign in their own spheres.38 Theoretically, this 
means that the provincial and federal governments could legislate in respect to 
different aspects of the same matters. This has led to administrative flexibility for the 
provinces and federal government with respect to a diverse array of matters; for 
example, securities,39 temperance,40 and entertainment in taverns.41 The exercise of 
the aspect doctrine ultimately allows provinces a greater scope to pass laws that are 
                                                
33 John P McEvoy, “The Federalism Jurisprudence of Michel Bastarache” in Nicolas CG Lambert, ed, At 
the Forefront of Duality: Essays in Honour of Michel Bastarache (Toronto: Carswell, 2011) 325. 
34 Hogg, supra note 7 at 15-7. 
35 WR Lederman, “The Concurrent Operation of Federal and Provincial Laws in Canada” (1963) 9:3 
McGill LJ 185 at 188. 
36 Hodge v The Queen, [1883] CR 9 AC 13, 3 Cart BNA 144 [Hodge].  
37 Ibid at para 30. 
38 Ibid at para 36.  
39 Multiple Access Ltd v McCutcheon [1982] 2 SCR 161, 138 DLR (3d) 1.  
40 Hodge, supra note 36.   
41 Rio Hotel Ltd v New Brunswick (Liquor Licensing Board), [1987] 2 SCR 59, 44 DLR (4th) 663. 
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particular to their needs. As will be explored later in this paper, one wonders why 
this same flexibility cannot be afforded to distinctive Aboriginal governments. 
The pith and substance doctrine and the aspect doctrine have led to de facto 
concurrent powers over certain matters in the federalism analysis. This invariably 
leads to more flexibility in law for levels of government recognized as orders in the 
Canadian federation. Binnie and LeBel JJ in Canadian Western Bank referred to this 
proposition as the “dominant tide” of Canadian federalism.42 This, in at least one 
way, is reasonably attributable to a desire to allow for distinctive, self-governing 
units (represented by provinces) to legislate with a maximum amount of flexibility. 
Flexibility in the legislative practice of Canadian self-government is but one 
legal implication of political diversity. The other legal implication derives from the 
text of the Constitution Act, 1867 itself, and its interpretation by the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council. The text and its subsequent interpretation has led, 
one can conclude, to an overall conception of Canadian federalism that grants a 
generous host of powers to the provinces, representing their own distinctive interests. 
In an insightful article, Peter Hogg and Wade Wright analyze the text of the 
Constitution Act, 1867 on this point. The article analyzes many aspects of the 
Constitution Act, 1867 and makes an overall conclusion that “the Act, as drafted, was 
intended to form the foundation for a federal system that is less centralized than 
many English-Canadian commentators have supposed.”43 However, how Hogg and 
Wright reach this conclusion with respect to textual analysis is important: 
Our conclusion is that the Constitution Act, 1867 includes conflicting 
signals as to the degree of centralization or decentralization stipulated by 
the federal scheme that the Act established. In our view, the framers 
deliberately tolerated these conflicting signals in the Act because they 
needed to accommodate conflicting goals—the desire for a strong central 
government (English-Canada) and the desire to protect local languages, 
cultures, and institutions (French-Canada and the Maritimes). The text is 
ambiguous, probably intentionally so. The framers of the Constitution 
needed these conflicting signals in order to ensure approval of their 
handiwork by the British North American colonists, who were divided by 
language, religion, tradition and location.44 
The express recognition of different cultures, languages, and other particularities in 
the text of the Constitution Act, 1867 is a strong indication that the framers wished 
for the demographic realities described above to have some force in law.   
However, the text is not the end. The early interpretation of the text, 
because of the doctrine of stare decisis, has largely bound today’s courts in 
interpreting the distribution of powers contained in the Constitution Act, 1867.  As 
                                                
42 Canadian Western Bank v Alberta, 2007 SCC 22 at para 37, [2007] 2 SCR 3. 
43 Peter W Hogg & Wade K Wright, “Canadian Federalism, the Privy Council and the Supreme Court: 
Reflections on the Debate about Canadian Federalism” (2005) 38:2 UBC L Rev 329 at 338. 
44 Ibid (emphasis added).  
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Hogg and Wright note, “[t]here is no doubt that the Privy Council favoured the 
provinces in federalism cases.”45 However, they follow that conclusion with an 
analysis of why the Privy Council was sympathetic to the provinces. Hogg and 
Wright argue that the Judicial Committee’s decisions were consistent with the 
demographic forces at play in Canada. As a short aside, an example is in order. In the 
Aeronautics Reference, Lord Sankey famously confirmed this thesis regarding the 
Judicial Committee’s predilection towards the provinces. The law lord stated: 
Inasmuch as the Act [of 1867] embodies a compromise under which the 
original Provinces agreed to federate, it is important to keep in mind that 
the preservation of the rights of minorities was a condition on which such 
minorities entered into the federation, and the foundation upon which the 
whole structure was subsequently erected. The process of interpretation as 
the years go on ought not to be allowed to dim or to whittle down the 
provisions of the original compact upon which the federation was 
founded.46 
Clearly, one of the major forces at play for the Judicial Committee was the 
influence of Quebec (Aboriginal peoples are equally, as will be seen below, an 
unrecognized force). According to Hogg and Wright, “[the] desire to protect their 
[French Canadian] language and culture has taken on the form of an insistence on 
provincial rights.”47 This cultural insistence seeped into other areas, beyond what 
was decided by the Judicial Committee in the Aeronautics Reference. From an 
economic standpoint, Hogg and Wright argue that the decisions of the law lords had 
an impact on the development of resources in Canada. Specifically, it would have 
been a perverse result for the Canadian economy to be completely dominated from 
the centre; and so, one sees the rise of distinctive provincial economies and cultures 
surrounding those economies.48 These forces led the Judicial Committee to give a 
narrow interpretation to the federal trade and commerce power, a generous 
interpretation to the provincial property and civil rights power, and a narrow 
interpretation to the federal residuary power.49 Of course, this legacy of the Judicial 
Committee largely lives on today. 
Thus, with respect to the Canadian federation, two traits of legal 
significance emerge from the political demographics described earlier. The first trait 
is an abiding flexibility that allows for coordinate exercise of power as between the 
provinces and the federal government. This flexibility is represented in the various 
doctrines, which provide a rich understanding of the distribution of powers: namely, 
the aspect doctrine and the pith and substance doctrine. The second trait, fuelled by 
                                                
45 Ibid at 339. 
46 Reference re the Regulation and Control of Aeronautics in Canada, [1932] AC 54 at para 70, 1 DLR 58 
[Aeronautics Reference]. 
47 Hogg & Wright, supra note 43 at 344. 
48 Ibid at 345−46. 
49 Ibid at 339−40. 
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the distinctive interplay between English and French at the time of Confederation, is 
an impetus towards decentralization to accommodate distinctive cultures. This trait is 
largely influenced by the text of the Constitution Act, 1867, but also by the sympathy 
of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, specifically as it relates to the trade 
and commerce power, the peace order and good government power, and property 
and civil rights in the province. 
These conclusions, and the demographic reality to which they are 
connected, are devoid of one particular group: Aboriginal peoples. Simply put, if 
Aboriginal peoples were viewed as a distinctive order of government, their 
governments would be able to access the flexible and generous approach to Canadian 
federalism in obvious ways. That said, one must articulate the importance of these 
conclusions for Aboriginal peoples. The Canadian experience is one of diversity, and 
the legal doctrines explored above reflect this reality. Therefore, the question of how 
Aboriginal peoples take advantage of these doctrines is, ultimately, a jurisdictional 
one. 
C. Aboriginal Peoples 
An eager reader may respond by saying that these conclusions mean nothing for 
Aboriginal peoples. After all, Aboriginal peoples were not parties to the original 
Confederation compact; in fact, they were actively marginalized.50 Further, the 
Charter has been inconclusive on a clear, existing right to Aboriginal self-
government in whole. While Canadian federalism may be flexible, so the critical 
analysis goes, it has been remarkably inflexible for Aboriginal peoples. At present, 
no inherent right to Aboriginal self-government, as a third order of government 
distinctive in its differing legitimacy, is recognized in the Constitution.  
Implicit in the above is a normative and legal criticism. The normative 
criticism is a form of “constitutional privity”—or in this case, a lack thereof. This 
argument proceeds on the basis that Aboriginal peoples lack “privity” to the original 
Confederation agreement.51 In that sense, it cannot (and some would argue, should 
not) matter that federalism is capable of absorbing a distinctive Aboriginal culture in 
Canada.  
The problem with the inflexibility of federalism for Aboriginal peoples 
derives from the fact that Aboriginal peoples have never truly been parties to 
Canada’s federal system (except, of course, as a class of subject in s. 91(24)). 
Though Aboriginal peoples were not “officially” parties to the Canadian federation 
at its outset (in that they were not recognized as a discrete order of government for 
the purposes of the Constitution Act, 1867) there is a great deal of history that has 
passed since that particular time. At present, s.35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 
specifically elevates treaties between Aboriginal peoples and the government of 
                                                
50 Turpel, supra note 6. 
51 Ibid. 
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Canada to constitutional status.52  This elevation is based, at least in part, on 
Aboriginal history. To that end, the bases and legitimacy of Aboriginal self-
government differ from the bases of Crown sovereignty. However, given the 
flexibility and generosity of Canadian federalism, this difference should not be 
viewed as an impediment; nor should a lack of constitutional privity be conclusive. 
Indeed, as the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples note, the generous 
interpretation of provincial rights by the Judicial Committee is equally applicable to 
Aboriginal collectives.53 The answer is constitutional recognition of the differing 
basis for the legitimacy of Aboriginal governments, once and for all. 
In support of this conclusion, Aboriginal history must be briefly explored. 
While many academic and historical projects have reviewed this history (and it is 
beyond the scope of this paper to survey them all), perhaps one of the most famous is 
the report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples.54 In that report, the 
Commission lays out a compelling case for inherent Aboriginal self-government, and 
delineates the possible explanations for this form of self-government. In this context, 
the Commission traces the history of Aboriginal peoples in Canada with reference to 
the case of Connolly v Woolrich.55 The facts of this particular case are less relevant 
than the holding of the Quebec Superior Court. The Commission lays the decision 
out as follows: 
Justice Monk stated that he was prepared to assume, for the sake of 
argument, that the first European traders to inhabit the North West brought 
with them their own laws as their birthright. Nevertheless, the region was 
already occupied by “numerous and powerful tribes of Indians; by 
aboriginal nations, who had been in possession of these countries for 
ages.” Assuming that French or English law had been introduced in the 
area at some point, “will it be contended that the territorial rights, political 
organization, such as it was, or the laws and usages of the Indian tribes, 
were abrogated; that they ceased to exist, when these two European 
nations began to trade with their aboriginal occupants?” Answering his 
own question in the negative, Justice Monk wrote: “In my opinion, it is 
beyond commentary that they did not, that so far from being abolished, 
they were left in full force, and were not even modified in the slightest 
degree, in regard to the civil rights of the natives”…In summary, then, the 
decision portrays Aboriginal peoples as autonomous nations living under 
the protection of the Crown, retaining their territorial rights, political 
organizations, and common laws…56 
Based on this historical treatment, the Report goes on to conclude: 
                                                
52 The Charter, supra note 4 at s. 35(1).  
53 Canada, Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Partners in Confederation: Aboriginal Peoples, 
Self-Government and the Constitution (Ottawa: Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, 1993) at 22 
[Royal Commission]. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Connolly v Woolrich (1867), 17 RJRQ 75, 1 CNLC 70. 
56 Royal Commission, supra note 53 at 6−7. 
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The doctrine of Aboriginal rights is not a modern innovation, invented by 
the courts to remedy injustices perpetrated in the past. It is one of the most 
ancient and enduring doctrines of Canadian law. It is reflected in the 
numerous treaties of peace and friendship concluded in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries, between Aboriginal peoples and the French and 
British Crowns, in the Royal Proclamation of 1763 and other instruments 
of the same period, in the treaties signed in Ontario, the West, and the 
North-West during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, in 
many statutes dealing with Aboriginal matters from earliest times, and not 
least in a series of judicial decisions extending over nearly two centuries.57 
The historical context referred to by the Commission has given rise, in its 
estimation, to a number of conclusions. One of these is apparent: the source of 
legitimacy for Aboriginal law and self-government is rooted not in the text of the 
Constitution Act, 1867, but in a historic occupation of land, coupled with an ongoing, 
privileged relationship with the British Crown. In other words, legitimacy is derived 
not from Crown sovereignty, but “by reason of the fact that Aboriginal peoples were 
once independent, self-governing entities in possession of most of the lands now 
making up Canada.”58 Secondly, if one combines this historical analysis with the 
above legal review of federalism, a conclusion becomes clear: our constitutional law 
is remarkably flexible in Canada. More importantly, it shows a diversity in its 
component parts that could, and should, easily encapsulate distinctive Aboriginal 
traits, including the differing bases of legitimacy.59  
Thus, there is no principled reason to argue that the diversity of the 
Canadian Constitution cannot recognize the fact that Aboriginal sovereignty arises 
from a different legitimacy than does Crown sovereignty. These different bases can 
be recognized as coordinate in the Constitution, but different in their sources.60 Thus, 
while one can debate whether the writ large right to Aboriginal self-government has 
been extinguished, our Constitution currently lacks such an explicit recognition for 
the different source of legitimacy for Aboriginal self-government rights. Recognition 
is the key, regardless of whether or not the right exists outside of the Constitution.61 
                                                
57 Ibid. The Commission further argues, based on this historical context, that the inherent right to self-
government already exists in s.35(1) of the Charter. Given the Supreme Court’s pronouncements on this 
issue, I do not agree with the Commission’s conclusion. What is abundantly clear is this: the inherent 
right to Aboriginal self-government derives from a historical basis. Our Constitution, at the current 
moment, does not expressly recognize this right. This is a question of jurisdiction.  
58 Brian Slattery, “The Constitutional Guarantee of Aboriginal and Treaty Rights” (1982-1983) 8:1 
Queen’s LJ 232 at 242. 
59 Though this paper has focused on describing the historical basis for the legitimacy of Aboriginal 
governments, the Supreme Court of Canada has done a far better job of exploring the relevant history. 
See Calder v British Columbia (AG) [1973] SCR 313, 34 DLR (3d) 145.  
60 Hodge, supra note 36, holds that this is true for provinces: why not for Aboriginal governments? 
61 Again, this is different than the argument made by the Commission, which presupposed the existence of 
a general right to Aboriginal self-government as an existing right in s. 35(1) of the Charter.  This is an 
example of the rights-based approach which has dominated Aboriginal jurisprudence. Defining what is 
existing is the concern of this approach. My concern is delineating the scope of orders of government as 
a matter of federalism.   
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To that end, Canada’s federalism is capable, on any reasonable reading, of this 
important task. Questioning Crown sovereignty in this way should not necessarily be 
anathema; after all, the federal system would not fall apart. It would simply require 
practical negotiations as to the interactions between federal and provincial 
governments, and Aboriginal lands and laws. Simply, recognition would provide the 
basis for these practical negotiations to occur. 
 That said, the second part of this paper presents a thornier problem: while it 
might be apparent that federalism can accommodate a more generous interpretation 
of Aboriginal rights in Canada, premised on the different source of legitimacy, 
should it accommodate this same generous interpretation, as a means of 
reconciliation? It is to that question that this paper now turns. 
II. ABORIGINAL PEOPLES IN THE CANADIAN FABRIC  
A. The Current Situation 
In attempting to answer why Canadian federalism should adapt to the reality of 
Aboriginal self-government rights in an inherent fashion, one must review the 
current situation of Aboriginal self-government in Canada. The key issue, as noted 
above, is constitutional recognition of the differing bases of legitimacy for 
Aboriginal self-government rights. 
As Kent McNeil cogently describes in his oft-quoted article on the subject, 
one cannot understand the place of Aboriginal peoples in Canada without describing 
the death of the Charlottetown Accord. As McNeil notes, the defeat of the 
Charlottetown Accord jeopardized the political will to make explicit and inherent 
self-government a reality in Canada. 62  In the immediate aftermath of the 
Charlottetown Accord, McNeil argued that other options existed for Aboriginal 
peoples to achieve self-government within the Canadian constitutional framework. 
Namely, he suggested negotiated agreements with the federal and some provincial 
governments. These agreements would involve delegated rather than inherent 
authority, and they may not be constitutionally protected.63 McNeil’s foresight was 
remarkably prescient; indeed, as of 2015, Canada has negotiated twenty-two of these 
same self-government agreements, eighteen of which are part of comprehensive land 
claims agreements.64 Three of these agreements have not been implemented by 
legislation, and because they are not inherent in nature, implementation is required.65 
Hundreds of Aboriginal communities exercise self-government at the pleasure of 
                                                
62 McNeil, supra note 11 at 98. 
63 Ibid at 99. 
64 Canada, Indigenous and Northern Affairs, The Government of Canada’s Approach to Implementation of 
the Inherent Right and the Negotiation of Aboriginal-Self Government (Canada: Indigenous and 
Northern Affairs, 2010) online: <www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100031843/1100100031844#PartI>. 
65 Ibid. 
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Crown delegation.66 There are various types of these agreements; some connected to 
modern treaties and others stand-alone self-government agreements, while still 
others convey sectoral jurisdiction for Aboriginal peoples over certain areas of policy 
(education, for example).67  
In short, these self-government agreements do provide a certain form of 
self-regulation for Aboriginal peoples within their communities. However, these self-
government agreements differ from an inherent right to Aboriginal self-government 
that exists independently from Crown sovereignty.68 In this case, as noted by Turpel, 
inherent means pre-existing and not granted by the Constitution (note the difference 
between grant and recognition). If one extends the point, inherency cannot and does 
not depend on statutory delegation (in this case, Crown sovereignty) for its 
existence.69 
The federal government, however, has something different to say on the 
matter.  In 1995, it famously announced that it, unilaterally, recognized the inherent 
right of self-government for Aboriginal peoples flowing from s. 35 of the 
Constitution Act, 1982.70 Indeed, the federal government essentially committed to 
pursuing delegated agreements as described above in 1995 in order to affect the 
recognition of inherent self-government. Specifically, it is prudent to quote 
generously from a parliamentary paper on the subject, which describes the very 
essence of the federal government’s policy at the relevant time: 
Under this policy, the range of subjects that the federal government is 
willing to negotiate includes matters internal to the group, integral to 
Aboriginal culture, and essential to operating as a government or 
institution. Examples are the establishment of government structures and 
internal… 
The Minister of Indian Affairs has a mandate to enter into negotiations 
with First Nations, the Inuit, and Métis groups in the north. The Federal 
Interlocutor for Métis and Non-Status Indians has a mandate to enter into 
negotiations with Métis south of the 60th parallel and Indian people who 
reside off a land base. For groups without a land base, the government is 
prepared to consider forms of public government, the devolution of 
programs and services, the development of institutions providing services, 
and arrangements in those subject matters where it is feasible to exercise 
authority in the absence of a land base.71 
                                                
66 Rustand, supra note 14 at 4. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid at 8. 
69 Turpel, supra note 6 at 125. 
70 Rustand, supra note 14 at 8. 
71  Canada, Parliamentary Research Branch, Aboriginal Self-Government by Jill Wherrett (Canada: 
Parliamentary Research Branch, 1999) online: <www.parl.gc.ca/Content/LOP/researchpublications/962-
e.htm>.  
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The problem with the approach employed by the federal government is one 
of legitimacy. There is an important distinction to be drawn between truly inherent 
Aboriginal self-government and inherency as recognized by the federal government 
in 1995. One sees from the foregoing that legitimacy flows from the Crown, not 
from the self-governing history of Aboriginal peoples—in other words, this is not 
inherent in any sense of the term. The federal government is “willing to negotiate” 
only what it is willing to negotiate, and nothing more. This is in stark contrast to the 
Charlottetown Accord, as described by the Commission, which provided that 
Aboriginal governments were to be sovereign in their own spheres and not inferior to 
the other orders of government, with accompanying rules for inconsistent laws 
between the three orders of government in Canada. 72  One sees why inherent 
government may be more desirable for Aboriginal peoples: it allows them to exercise 
sovereignty according to their own “values [and] priorities” in accordance with their 
“languages, cultures, economies, identities, institutions and traditions.”73  This seems 
to be in concert with the plea of Aboriginal peoples across Canada.74 
In summary, the federal government’s policy (which, as noted above, has 
continued in the present day in large part through the negotiation of delegated-
sovereignty agreements) is a mystery wrapped in a riddle—at its heart is a vexing 
contradiction. On the one hand, it recognizes through an administrative policy the 
inherent right to self-government for Aboriginal peoples in Canada (which has not 
been recognized by the courts).75 Yet the actions of the government belie this policy 
by delegating powers. As noted above, the inherent right to self-government can only 
be recognized via a third order of government, in a constitutional amendment 
process.76 It is to that problem that this paper now turns. 
B. Why Inherent? 
The underlying argument of this exposition, so far enunciated, holds that federalism 
is a forgotten tool of reconciliation between Aboriginal peoples and Canada.  
Recognizing the flexibility of the federal structure is the key to understanding the 
potential for recognizing distinct forms of legitimacy—specifically for Aboriginal 
peoples.  
                                                
72 Peter W Hogg & Mary Ellen Turpel “Implementing Aboriginal Self-Government: Constitutional and 
Jurisdictional Issues” (1995) 74:2 Can Bar Rev 187 at 191. The built-in dispute mechanisms are one of 
the reasons, to be surveyed later, why inherent self-government brings a great deal of clarity to the law 
in this area. 
73 Charlottetown Accord, supra note 2. 
74  Compare and contrast the Contextual Statement with the demands of the recent Idle No More 
movement. As seen below, both the Contextual Statement and the demands of the Idle No More 
movement tie the importance of self-government to Aboriginal self-determination. 
75 Delgamuukw, supra note 5. 
76 Rustand, supra note 14 at 2. 
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On the other hand, the creative progeny of policymakers and Aboriginal 
peoples in Canada, an observer might argue, is entitled to deference. After all, we 
have ended years of complex constitutional negotiations (Meech Lake and 
Charlottetown, for example) and have been able to accomplish complicated public 
policy goals as it pertains to Aboriginal peoples without the need for provincial 
consent. Nevertheless, the federal government has papered over larger problems. The 
problem is fundamentally theoretical—it is important to define the scope of 
difference between the delegated self-government promulgated by the Canadian 
government since 1995 and the inherent self-government promised by the 
Charlottetown Accord. As Peter Hogg notes: 
…the aboriginal right of self-government extends only to activities that 
took place before European contact, and then only to those activities that 
were an integral part of the aboriginal society. These restrictions are very 
severe even for rights to hunt and fish and harvest, but they are singularly 
inappropriate to the right of self-government. In order to give meaning to 
self-government in a modern context, it should be couched in wider 
terms.77 
 Surely, true Aboriginal self-government should be defined beyond the 
scope of an Aboriginal right defined in Sparrow or a delegated form of sovereignty 
that relies on the Crown for legitimacy. This said, there are two reasons why inherent 
Aboriginal self-government is a better road for the Canadian federation and 
Aboriginal peoples alike. First, the Charter and its associated system of common law 
adjudication is the primary means, but not the best means, by which Aboriginal 
peoples have attempted to vindicate their rights. Legal scholars, Aboriginal peoples 
themselves, and politicians have not given much thought to the idea of political 
reconciliation through federalism—a recognition of the Aboriginal peoples of 
Canada as peoples, rather than as individuals. The recognition of Aboriginal self-
government would do much to entrench an understanding of Aboriginal peoples in 
Canada’s constitution, beyond the Charter’s limited court-centric conception. 
Second, connected to this recognition, inherent Aboriginal self-government would 
restore balance to Aboriginal communities, with a corresponding benefit accruing 
with respect to material Aboriginal issues. Again, this sort of benefit is best accessed 
through political channels, not judicial ones. 
1. Political and Legal Considerations 
The politics of the Charter has contributed to a court-centric conception of Canadian 
constitutionalism. Instead of viewing the Constitution as an organic document which 
binds different communities together, individualized rights litigation has become the 
name of the Charter game. It is as if we have forgotten one half of our 
Constitution—the distribution of powers and the values that it represents. This sense 
of forgetfulness has contributed to a political and legal vacuum in terms of 
                                                
77 Hogg, supra note 7 at 28-26 (emphasis added). 
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Aboriginal issues. As noted by Dr. Nicole O’Byrne, all law is politics, 78 and so one 
cannot view the issue of a “third order” of government in isolation.  
Dealing first with the political issues, the fate of Aboriginal peoples in 
Canada (perhaps as a function of their status as “federal persons” under s. 91(24) of 
the Constitution Act, 1867) has long been tied to the ballot box. Between the 1969 
White Paper, which would have stripped Aboriginal peoples of their status in 
Canada, and the Charlottetown Accord, one can see two very different approaches 
and conceptions to the way in which Aboriginal peoples fit into the Canadian 
compact. Yet, this political footballing does not end at theory—indeed, one need 
only look at the story of the Kelowna Accord, and its subsequent scrapping, to see 
how intricately politics ties in with the place of Aboriginal peoples in Canada.79 
The benefit of inherent self-government in mitigating against this sort of 
political interference and vacillation is this: it insulates Aboriginal peoples from the 
need to rely, solely, on federal government assistance, support, and the courts to 
vindicate their inherent rights. As Mary Ellen Turpel notes, “recognizing three orders 
of government served to ensure that the Indian Act style of domination would be left 
behind, not retrenched.”80 To be sure, the entrenchment of constitutional status for an 
order of Aboriginal government would require the sorting out of implementation 
issues—constitutional entrenchment is not enough.81 Bilateral negotiations would 
have to work out the intricacies of the political and financial arrangements between 
Aboriginal governments and the federal government. This criticism of inherent self-
government should not be understated: in the aftermath of the Charlottetown Accord, 
one of the principle criticisms was that the Accord was lacking in detail and clarity in 
how it would actually operate on the ground.82 
 Yet, one could presume self-government would bring clarity and 
consistency to the relationship between the federal and Aboriginal governments. 
Provinces do not have their very fates thrown to the winds because of a change in the 
federal government. That is because of their status as constitutionally protected 
jurisdictions. A whole field of federalism has arisen which manages relations and 
negotiations between the provincial and federal governments—executive 
federalism.83 There is no reason to believe that these same styles of federalism, in 
                                                
78 Nicole O’Byrne, “Address” (Aboriginal Peoples and Law Seminar Class delivered at the Faculty of 
Law, University of New Brunswick, 19 September 2015) [unpublished]. 
79 John Weinstein, Quiet Revolution West: The Rebirth of Métis Nationalism (Calgary: Fifth House 
Publishers, 2007) at 175−190. 
80 Turpel, supra note 6 at 128. 
81 See Hogg & Turpel, supra note 72. Financing and negotiation would work out the particulars of the 
right, but those negotiations would start from the premise of inherency. This was the promise of 
Charlottetown. 
82 Ibid at 191. 
83  See, for example, intergovernmental agreements, which Charlottetown would have made legally 
enforceable and binding as in Macklem et al, supra note 15 at 478−81. 
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addition to the legal dispute mechanisms detailed below, would be unsuitable to the 
task of mediating disputes between Aboriginal and federal governments. 
 If constitutional protection is to be extended not only to Aboriginal rights 
(as per s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982), but also to Aboriginal peoples as an 
order of government, Aboriginal peoples would be insulated from the tides of 
political opportunism in a fashion similar to the provinces. This boils down to a 
simple principle of constitutional theory. Once a matter has been constitutionally 
entrenched, or in other cases, proscribed, the matter is removed from political debate 
and from the control of the majority.84 Of course, constitutional amendment to 
achieve this goal is cloaked in legitimacy—judicial amendment, in such a wholesale 
fashion, may not be.85 
Political considerations aside, there are distinct legal benefits associated 
with entrenching an Aboriginal order of government in the Canadian Constitution. 
Two come to mind. In the first place, as previously noted in this paper, Aboriginal 
peoples and their supporters have resorted almost exclusively to the courts to 
vindicate their rights. One can see why: the Charlottetown Accord failed because the 
majority chose not to ratify it; the Kelowna Accord was scrapped as a matter of 
political choice. Resort to the courts, however, is not tied to political failure. This is 
directly because the Charter has transformed our constitutional understanding. 
Specifically, it has changed the role of Canada’s judiciary and the way that the courts 
do their work.  
The courts no longer review law exclusively—after the Charter, as Carl and 
Ellen Baar argue, the Supreme Court emphasizes its law development function.86 It 
makes new law in a variety of fields; the Court sets aside old precedent for new law, 
and attempts to piece together disparate strands of law in an attempt to come to 
sensible dispositions in cases involving a certain set of parties.87 But the Supreme 
Court has also self-described itself as “guardian of the Constitution.”88 It has become 
a “constitutional oracle,” issuing broad declarations of constitutional policy which 
shape our discourse and define our rights.89 If the Supreme Court says we have a 
right to physician assisted dying, we do;90 if the Supreme Court decides there is a 
right to strike protected by the Charter, there is;91 if the Supreme Court says that 
                                                
84 Antonin Scalia, “Romancing the Constitution: Interpretation as Invention” in Grant Huscroft & Ian 
Brodie, eds, Constitutionalism in the Charter Era (Markham: LexisNexis Canada, 2004) 340. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Carl Baar & Ellen Baar, “Diagnostic Adjudication in Appellate Courts: The Supreme Court of Canada 
and the Charter of Rights” (1989) 27:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 1.  
87 Ibid. 
88 Hunter v Southam Inc [1984] 2 SCR 145 at para 16, 11 DLR (4th) 641. 
89 FL Morton & Rainer Knopff, The Charter Revolution and the Court Party (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2000) at 53. 
90 Carter v Canada (AG), 2015 SCC 5, [2015] 1 SCR 331.  
91 Mounted Police Association of Ontario v Canada (AG) 2015 SCC 1, [2015] 1 SCR 3. 
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discrimination must impugn human dignity to be constitutionally proscribed, it 
must;92 but if the Court then decides that human dignity means nothing, it does not.93 
The nature of the Court’s decisions in these cases certainly supports a conclusion: the 
Charter has transformed the judiciary into a political institution, a role for which it is 
not designed. 
The impetus for Aboriginal peoples to establish their rights through the 
courts is understandable, given the highly political nature of judicial decision-making 
at the Supreme Court. On the other hand, for those who believe in predictability and 
clarity in the law, the result has not been perfect. With specific reference to 
Aboriginal rights, Hogg and Turpel note that the issues related to inherent Aboriginal 
self-government are wide open to judicial interpretation, and for that reason, they are 
not amenable to judicial resolution—constitutional amendment is the preferred 
approach.94 As a larger statement, the preference for constitutional amendment is a 
function of deficiencies in the common law system to define the relationships 
between orders of government. In essence, this might be an unfortunate symptom of 
the common law system to which we are accustomed in the Western world. Indeed, 
Justice Antonin Scalia argues: 
…this system of making law by judicial opinion, and making law by 
distinguishing earlier cases, is what every American law student, every 
newborn lawyer, first sees when he opens his eyes. And the impression 
remains for life. His image of the great judge…who has the intelligence to 
discern the best rule of law for the case at hand and then the skill to 
perform the broken-field running through earlier cases that leaves him free 
to impose that rule: distinguishing one prior case on the left, straight-
arming another one on the right, high-stepping away from another 
precedent about to tackle him from the rear until (bravo!) he reaches the 
goal—good law.95 
This practice of avoiding precedent, distinguishing cases, and on some 
occasions, misapplying law, can clearly lead to disjointed results—this is even more 
so given the Court’s penchant for intervention in more cases of greater importance. 
The goal of the common law system is the adjudication of discrete disputes between 
adverse parties—it is difficult to arrive at systemic, consistent and clear jurisdictional 
conclusions in the adversarial context. The varying cases on Aboriginal title, rights, 
and treaty interpretation is but an illustration of this reality. How can one reconcile 
St. Catherine’s Milling with Tsilqho’tin?96 On the other hand, how can J (J) be seen 
as anything more than a gross misapplication of Sparrow?97 How can be Sioui be 
                                                
92 Law v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] 1 SCR 497, 170 DLR (4th) 1.  
93 R v Kapp, 2008 SCC 41, [2008] 2 SCR 483.  
94 Hogg & Turpel, supra note 72 at 190−91. 
95 Scalia, Interpretation, supra note 3 at 9. 
96 Compare St. Catherine’s Milling and Lumber Company v The Queen [1888] UKPC 70, 14 App Cas 46 
and Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia, 2014 SCC 44, [2014] 2 SCR 257. 
97 The Agenda with Steve Paikin, “Treating Aboriginal Rights” (November 25, 2014), online: YouTube 
<www.youtube.com/watch?v=nCnLQGX0ZKU> at 00h:5m:24s. 
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reconciled with Marshall #1?98 This comparison merely illustrates the inconsistency 
of the common law method in adjudicating Aboriginal law disputes. Of course, one 
can point to areas of the law where jurisprudential approaches have evolved over the 
course of many years, leading to different legal results. That said, this contention 
does not change the fact that the area of Aboriginal law in Canada is a minefield. 
There would be a certain repose associated with entrenching an inherent right of self-
government, and all which flows from it, in the Constitution. Otherwise, Aboriginal 
rights will remain a web of cases and judicial opinions that are at cross-purposes.  
Connected to the unsuitability of the common law courts to adjudicate the 
breadth of relationships between coordinate jurisdictions, the second benefit relates 
to dispute mechanisms. As previously noted, Canadian constitutional law has 
evolved to include a flexible set of doctrines that mediate and delineate jurisdictions 
and disputes between orders of government.99  For example, the Charlottetown 
Accord expressly included a limitation on inherent Aboriginal self-government in the 
form of a peace, order, and good government provision, similar to the provision 
which heads the catalogue of federal powers in s.91 of the Constitution Act, 1867.100 
Of course, as a third order of government, should constitutional amendment be 
pursued, Aboriginal peoples could maximize the scope of their jurisdiction with 
reliance on the pith and substance and the aspect doctrines. In the same way 
provinces benefit from a generous and flexible federalism (heralded, in part, by the 
Judicial Committee), Aboriginal peoples could become a part of the fabric of 
Canadian constitutional federalism and benefit as well. This is why the flexibility of 
Canadian federalism is so integral, and why federal structures still matter—separate 
from the Charter, these structures provide the space for Aboriginal peoples to govern 
themselves within Canada if the structure properly recognizes Aboriginal peoples as 
a central part of Confederation.  
In this respect, one could theorize that there would be fewer jurisdictional 
disputes and fewer application-of-laws disputes, which have largely been the 
centerpiece of Aboriginal defendants in provincial offences prosecutions.101 There 
would be an existing set of dispute mechanisms which have successfully mediated 
disputes between orders of government since 1867. No doubt, these mechanisms 
would have to be expanded and massaged in order to adapt to a reality where three 
orders of government exist. However, as noted previously, Canadian federalism is 
remarkably flexible. It can accommodate difference and asymmetry. In this respect, 
the legal benefit of flexibility in federalism would provide clarity to an uncertain area 
                                                
98 Compare R v Sioui [1990] 1 SCR 1025, 70 DLR (4th) 427 and R v Marshall [1999] 3 SCR 456, 177 
DLR (4th) 513.   
99 In addition to the pith and substance doctrine and the aspect doctrine, the paramountcy doctrine, the 
doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity, and the peace, order and good government power also govern 
provincial-federal relations. Each of these doctrines bring stability to relations between the orders of 
government.  
100 Charlottetown Accord, supra note 2. 
101 See the litany of cases relating to provincial prosecutions and Aboriginal/treaty rights erected as a 
defence. 
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of the law in Canada. Federalism in Canada already contains the tools of dispute 
resolution.102 
2. Material Aboriginal Issues 
Constitutional theory is not the end goal of inherent self-government. As noted in the 
Introduction of this paper, the theoretical considerations are threshold matters to get 
to the real heart of the issue: the way by which Aboriginal peoples can achieve 
meaningful reconciliation in the Canadian federation. 
This question is not only a problem of constitutional law—it has material 
consequences as well. Mary Ellen Turpel noted this connection in the aftermath of 
the Charlottetown Accord: 
Why are there grave social, economic and political problems for 
Aboriginal peoples in Canada? […] One way of understanding matters is 
to realize that the current situation for Aboriginal peoples in Canada is one 
of imbalance […] First Nations do not have a balance in their relations 
with Canadian governments or the Canadian people. This imbalance is 
echoed in Aboriginal communities, where social harmony, a key objective 
of community life, has deteriorated. Aboriginal peoples have never been 
full partners in nation building in Canada.103 
Turpel’s comment has a modern impact. As an example, take Idle No More. That 
movement was, arguably, the closest we have come in Canada to a cohesive 
statement of Aboriginal peoples across the country. One must not forget that the 
context of Idle No More was underlined by revelations of material and abject poverty 
in a Northern Ontario reserve community, Attawapiskat.104 This poverty formed the 
backdrop to a series of demands on the part of Idle No More, one of which related 
directly to issues of Aboriginal rights. Indeed, in its list of objectives, the movement 
called on the Government of Canada, along with the provinces and territories, to 
“[c]ease its policy of extinguishment of Aboriginal Title and recognize and affirm 
Aboriginal Title and Rights, as set out in section 35 of Canada’s constitution, and 
recommended by the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples.”105 As noted above, 
the Commission was particularly interested in inherent self-government. One cannot, 
in this respect, divorce the material conditions of Aboriginal peoples in Canada from 
the demands for a proper space for self-government as recognized in the 
Constitution. To do so would run directly counter to the Idle No More vision.  
                                                
102 I am alive to a potential criticism: there is no doubt that the doctrines heretofore described arose out of 
common law disputes between provinces and the federal government. Yet the application of the 
federalism doctrines is not controversial—nowadays, their application leads to predictable outcomes, as 
doctrines should. The case, as described earlier, is different when it comes to the Charter. 
103 Turpel, supra note 6 at 120. 
104 See Charlie Angus, Children of the Broken Treaty (Regina: University of Regina Press, 2015). 
105 See Idle No More, “Calls for Change”, online: Idle No More <www.idlenomore.ca/calls_for_change>. 
2016] WANDERING WITHOUT A TORCH 391 
 
Of course, one can question the efficacy of the advocacy strategy employed 
by Idle No More. However, at least in this connection between material conditions 
and governance claims, there can be no mistake that the movement was seized by the 
right idea in concert with traditional Aboriginal concerns.  Indeed, the relationship 
between culture, material wellbeing, and sound political systems is central to the 
Aboriginal understanding of the world. This proposition is made clear in Taiake 
Alfred’s work, Peace, Power, and Righteousness: An Indigenous Manifesto. In his 
work, Alfred approaches material problems of Aboriginal peoples from the position 
of Aboriginal doctrine. That is, he views and explains social and political problems 
from an Aboriginal lens. At the social level, Alfred cogently describes the tragic state 
of Aboriginal peoples writ large in a material sense. According to Alfred, the current 
situation of Aboriginal peoples in Canada is “…diametrically opposed to the social 
and political culture that sustained [our] communities in the past.”106 This connects 
to the traditional relationship between Aboriginal peoples and Canada, according to 
Alfred: “(T)he legacy and history of Canada’s past subjugation of Aboriginal peoples 
has led to dispossession, disempowerment, and disease…”107 He further argues that: 
Most Native life is a painful burden that is the result of colonialism. Yet 
the real tragedy is that many Native people are left to wander aimlessly for 
want of the inspiration that a healthy, supportive, and cohesive community 
can provide. Cultural dislocation has led to despair…”108 
A progressive might view Alfred’s view as backwards looking. That said, 
his connection between cultural dislocation, systemic political issues, and material 
problems is a connection supported in the modern-day Idle No More movement and 
by non-Aboriginal observers alike. The poor material status of many Aboriginal 
peoples in this country is a matter of the public record. Indeed, Wiseman, as a non-
Aboriginal political observer, tends to agree with Alfred’s description of current 
Aboriginal affairs and takes the argument a step further by citing current material 
problems in Aboriginal communities. Wiseman notes “…Aboriginal identity and 
culture were at first systematically and zealously suppressed. Aboriginal culture was 
derided and vilified as inhumane.”109 According to Wiseman, this “often entailed the 
forced separation of parents and children, the suppression of their languages, and the 
indoctrination of Aboriginal children with the exoteric trappings of religions and 
customs alien to their own esoteric spiritual, cultural traditions.”110 
Connected to the conduct of Canadian authority, Wiseman notes that 
Aboriginal cultures are “disproportionately afflicted with social pathologies: 
exceptionally high rates of incarceration, spousal, sexual, and substance abuse, 
alcoholism, and suicide.”111 These social pathologies have broken apart Aboriginal 
                                                
106 Alfred, supra note 19 at 46. 
107 Ibid at 58. 
108 Ibid. 
109 Wiseman, supra note 24 at 103. 
110 Ibid. 
111 Ibid at 105. 
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families and have contributed to a general cultural dislocation in these communities. 
However, the material problems of Aboriginal peoples certainly do not stop there. 
Wiseman argues that “[a]s a group, Aboriginals are economic have-nots: poorly 
housed, overrepresented among the unemployed, of below average incomes and 
levels of educational attainment.”112 Further, the cultural dislocation described by 
Alfred has adversely affected health outcomes in Aboriginal communities. Wiseman 
submits that Aboriginal peoples are generally “[s]ubject to shorter-than-average 
lifespans, they suffer comparatively high rates of infant mortality, tuberculosis, 
diabetes, and HIV-AIDS.”113 
These social facts are largely indisputable. Not as a matter of coincidence, 
the Charlottetown Accord (with its promise of inherent Aboriginal self-government) 
made this same connection in similar terms. In the Contextual Statement of the 
Accord, the framers put it as such: 
The exercise of the right referred to in subsection (1) [‘the inherent right 
of self-government within Canada’] includes the authority of the duly 
constituted legislative bodies of the Aboriginal peoples, each within its 
own jurisdiction, 
(a) to safeguard and develop their languages, cultures, economies, 
identities, institutions and traditions, and 
(b) to develop, maintain and strengthen their relationship with their 
lands, waters and environment,  
so as to determine and control their development as peoples according to 
their own values and priorities and to ensure the integrity of their 
societies.114 
Idle No More, Alfred’s thesis, and the above Charlottetown Accord 
Contextual Statement, in one clear way, affect the same conclusion. All thread 
together an integral benefit of inherent control over one’s land and government—that 
is, the salutary benefits that flow in terms of material well-being and cultural 
development.  
Some radical Aboriginal activists have argued for full sovereign 
independence from Canada as a means of achieving these goals. If Canada is the 
problem, so the argument goes, independence is the solution. However, most serious 
observers view this as impossible, or if not, practically problematic.115 Inherent self-
government within the Canadian constitutional framework provides an alternative to 
the independence suggestion—it accomplishes the same salutary objectives while 
recognizing the Aboriginal fact in constitutional letter. This, if one follows Alfred 
and the other authorities, will have the effect of recognizing the foundation for 
stronger and healthier Aboriginal communities.  
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More can be said on the material problems that plague Aboriginal peoples 
in this country. Books have been, and could be written. Constitutional law cannot 
solve poverty generally. However, constitutional law and theory can provide an 
adequate first step by which Aboriginal peoples can develop their own societies and 
solve their own problems. This has long been the project of Aboriginal peoples in 
Canada. 
III. CONCLUSION 
There can be no doubt that the recognition of a third order of inherent Aboriginal 
self-government is easier said than done. The process of constitutional amendment, 
as noted earlier, is particularly taxing by the numbers, and in any event, requires 
herculean political will. Further, constitutional entrenchment will not solve every 
problem, material or political, in Aboriginal communities. Entrenchment would 
require good-faith negotiations to work out the particulars of any inherent self-
government arrangement. If Aboriginal communities are self-governing, as 
provinces are, they would need to be geographically defined. Resource management 
would be a particular concern, as between the federal government, the provinces, and 
these new, self-sustaining Aboriginal communities. These are practical 
considerations which should not be forgotten.  
It is unclear whether anyone is able to even begin thinking about these 
questions at this point. After all, we are all still bed-ridden with Charteritis. We 
await with bated-breath the next Court decision, that maybe, just might, finally, 
emancipate Aboriginal peoples in a way that time has not allowed. Of course, this 
seems ludicrous if we think about it for a fraction of a minute. Until we get ourselves 
off this intoxicating sickness, we abdicate our collective responsibility as a country 
to come to meaningful political resolutions. Doing so will involve a dose of courage.  
Courage involves, at a very basic level, viewing the cavernous divide 
between Aboriginal peoples and Canada through the correct theoretical lens. But 
difficulty with respect to theory should not be conflated with impossibility. The state 
of Aboriginal law in Canada is currently in flux; it lacks certainty; and this 
uncertainty, in the estimation of this exposition, cannot lead to a meaningful 
vindication of rights for any group. There must be a better way. 
By way of review, the main contention of this paper was that federalism in 
Canada can and should recognize a constitutionally entrenched third order of 
inherent Aboriginal self-government. In other words, some academic concern should 
centre around federalism rather than the Charter for a satisfying resolution to issues 
of Aboriginal jurisdiction in Canada. On the first branch of this argument, this paper 
contended that the history of Canadian federalism has demonstrated two abiding 
traits: a respect for diversity and minority rights, and a flexibility that permits the 
exercise of these diverse rights as component parts of a larger whole. To this end, 
this paper reviewed the legal codification of these traits by the Judicial Committee of 
the Privy Council and reviewed the current legal doctrines of federalism to make the 
case for diversity and flexibility with respect to an inherent right of self-government. 
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On the second branch of the argument, this paper articulated the reasons 
why Canadian federalism should evolve to incorporate a right to inherent self-
government for Aboriginal peoples. This paper reviewed why the current system of 
delegated Crown-sovereignty is not inherent, and why inherent control of 
governments for Aboriginal peoples is beneficial from a legal and political 
perspective. The fact of historic Aboriginal self-government is not enough; 
recognition of that fact is integral from a position of legal clarity. In whole, this 
paper has attempted to make the argument that inherent self-government for 
Aboriginal peoples must be achieved through constitutional amendment and 
recognition in order to be truly inherent. Once accomplished, the existing doctrines 
of federalism can aid in incorporating Aboriginal peoples into the fabric of the 
Canadian Constitution. 
These questions are fundamentally important in present-day Canada. As 
previously noted, Canada is embarking on a new era. That era is paradoxical in 
nature—it is hopeful from a political perspective, but frustrated in a sense that a 
resolution seems far off. Yet, on the eve of a new administration in Ottawa that seeks 
to create a meaningful, lasting relationship with Aboriginal peoples in Canada, it will 
no longer be enough to simply throw money at the problem. Money has not solved 
the issues in Kaschechewan, for example. Additionally, it has not provided a 
meaningful political resolution for Aboriginal leaders, nor Aboriginal peoples.  
There seems to be an appetite for foundational change—Aboriginal peoples are 
seeking a place in this country. In the present-day where there is a great deal of 
sympathy for the plight of Aboriginal peoples in this country, and alongside the 
litany of other constitutional problems facing Canada (the Senate of Canada, for 
example), perhaps now is the moment—the moment where a major step can be taken 
towards reconciliation in the Canadian constitutional order.  
Back to courage. Courage in this context involves shifting our gaze to 
federalism. The tools of federalism, as analyzed and applied in this paper, can be the 
bridge towards reconciliation.  Federalism is fundamentally about the place of 
coordinate authorities in Canada—and, significantly, the doctrines of federalism can 
locate a place for Aboriginal peoples in Canada. But this requires viewing the issue 
of Aboriginal self-government as one of community. Perhaps it was said best by 
Justice Scalia when he said: 
It is foolish to sit, wringing one's hands, wondering what the Supreme 
Court is going to tell us the Constitution requires on an issue […]. And 
that is what we are condemned to do unless we can screw up our courage 
and say, “Let's throw the dice.”116 
The Supreme Court of Canada does not control the futures of Aboriginal 
peoples. Aboriginal peoples do. When we view the issue as a problem of community, 
federalism as a potential solution becomes clear. Courage to go back to the future, 
back to federalism, is the antidote to a bad case of Charteritis. 
                                                
116 Antonin Scalia, “A Constitutional Convention: How Well Would It Work?” (Forum address delivered 
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